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What Determines the Finance-Growth Nexus? 
An Endogenous Growth Model and Empirical Evidence 
Abstract: 
An endogenous growth model with a financial sector is formulated, and empirical analyses 
are conducted. The model exhibits structural shifts and breaks caused by institutional change, 
suggesting that a linear approach is inadequate. To address this point empirically, we fit data 
for 90 countries from 1960–2000 to a standard growth equation with a proxy for financial 
activity. Firstly, it is shown that a growth enhancing outcome of financial activity is contin-
gent on a sound institutional framework. Then, we order the sample by control variables 
which follow from the model as potential causes of breaks in the adjustment process. Thresh-
old regressions reveal non-linearity that is consistent with the model. Most importantly, we 
find signs for excessive financial activity. 
1 Introduction 
During the last few years, there has been a revival of research on the finance-growth nexus, 
referring to a variety of methodological approaches, which has led to an impressive output 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Nevertheless, comparatively little is known about the 
interaction of financial activity on the one hand and other economic, social, or political phe-
nomena which by themselves are determinants of economic development and growth, or con-
stitute the framework under which the financial system has to operate. This paper aims at ad-
dressing theses questions.  
The recent literature concerned with finance and growth can be loosely grouped into four 
categories. Firstly, financial activity and economic growth are seen as not causally related. In 
this view, the observable correlation between them is spurious: economies grew, and so did 
their financial sectors, but the two follow their own logic. Secondly, financial activity is seen 
as the result of economic activity. As the growing scale of economic activities requires more 
and more capital, institutional raising and pooling of funds for industry are substituted for 
individual fortunes and retained profits. It is fair to say, however, that due to the new litera-
ture in this field, these two perspectives have lost ground. On the other hand, a third – and 
now certainly the most prominent – strand of the literature identifies financial activity as a 
determinant of economic growth.1 Specifically, recent theoretical models give rationales for 
the assumption that well functioning monetary and banking systems and capital markets may 
                                                           
1  The standard reference as the seminal contribution is KING/LEVINE (1993), though this line of research can 
be traced back at least to ADELMAN/MORRIS (1968). In the 1990s, Ross Levine has probably been the most 
active researcher in this field; for an authoritative survey of many of his widely cited results, see LEVINE 
(1997). After this survey, the literature has multiplied, and Levine and his co-authors are to this date setting 
important accents on the agenda. This line of research has been followed among others, by, DE GREGORIO/ 
GUIDOTTI (1995), BERTHÉLEMY/VAROUDAKIS (1996) and RAJAN/ZINGALES (1998). For a recent study see 
BENHABIB/SPIEGEL (2001).   – 3 –
be crucial for economic growth. The arguments vary, but Schumpeterian authors as well as 
some Neo-Keynesians usually stress the banking system's ability to create money and to 
channel it into productive and innovative uses. Others claim that it is the information gather-
ing and processing, which is accomplished by professional actors on credit and capital mar-
kets, that helps to improve the efficiency of capital allocation. Fourthly, some scholars see 
financial activity – at least occasionally – as an impediment to real economic activity. 2 Here, 
the focus lies on the potentially destabilizing effects of financial overtrading and crises, and 
the financial system is regarded as inherently unstable. 
Unfortunately, there is no simple procedure to determine which view is empirically adequate, 
since the factors that govern economic growth admittedly include many others besides finan-
cial activity; and interactions among them are likely to prevail.  
A first way to address these questions empirically is obviously to look whether economic his-
tory offers any answers. We think that there are indeed at least some fairly general conclu-
sions. As scholars of economic and financial history have convincingly argued,3 in the now 
developed countries, modern financial systems generally evolved during the very early stages 
of their industrialization. Moreover, financial development – as measured by GOLDSMITH'S 
financial interrelation ratio (conveniently proxied by M2/GDP) – generally leveled off after a 
few decades, reaching its fully developed stage4 by the beginning of the twentieth century. 
These historical observations imply that in the process of industrialization, finance may have 
been a growth-stimulating rather than a growth-induced phenomenon. 
In addition to this, as many observers have noted,5 financial dualism is the rule outside the 
developed part of the world: enclaves of modern finance serve but a few export oriented 
firms, whereas the majority of economic transactions takes place in the traditional sector 
which – leaving aside local peculiarities – is basically functioning in the same way as it did in 
the now developed countries before their industrialization. This observation implies that in the 
financially and economically less developed countries, there might be a latent, but unex-
ploited potential for growth. On the other hand, poor countries suffer from a host of difficul-
ties. These range from a lack of physical capital to a failure to support economic development 
with adequate skills and include economic policy with a high time preference rate, which is 
probably not especially helpful to promote growth and development in the long run.  
                                                           
2  Apart from a few 'monetary cranks', a wide range of distinguished economists give arguments supporting 
this view, among others KEYNES (1936), KINDLEBERGER (1978), DIAMOND/DYBVIG (1983), SINGH (1997), 
and CHANCELLOR (1999). 
3  The main body of this literature goes back to the 1960s, e.g. GERSCHENKRON (1962), PATRICK (1966), 
GOLDSMITH (1969, 1987), CAMERON ET AL. (1967). 
4  Note, however, that financial interrelation ratios for developed economies vary considerably (from less than 
unity to up to three) from country to country due to different institutional frameworks such as government 
provision of pension schemes, structure of the housing market or the level of commitment to rules and 
norms in financial relations. 
5 SHAW (1973), MCKINNON (1973), FRY (1995), to mention just the most prominent.   – 4 –
Hence, in poor countries, the potential benefits from financial activity might be more than 
outweighed by their disadvantageous starting point. In addition to this, the benefits of finance 
with respect to growth and development could be contingent on the economic and institu-
tional environment with various 'poverty-traps'.6 Moreover, without 'rule of law' and/or 'trust', 
financial interrelations and contracts cause more transaction costs than in more favorable en-
vironments.7 In addition, the character of social organization may affect the way in which 
financial interrelations operate, so that financial activity is strongly embedded in the socio-
economic and political environment in which it is supposed to perform its tasks.8 
Finally, financial development is a skill-intensive element of economic development. While it 
may not be costly in terms of physical capital, a sophisticated financial system absorbs a fair 
share of a country's highly skilled and motivated manpower, which – from a macro perspec-
tive – implies considerable opportunity costs.9 Our argument is therefore that the marginal 
contribution of the financial system to economic development cannot be evaluated without an 
analysis of its interactions with a country's human capital resources, and the suspected interac-
tions are by no means obvious. A priori, the optimum development path might be a balanced 
co-movement of human capital and financial development, but it could just as well pay to 
channel highly skilled human capital into the financial sector at higher rates during certain 
stages, whereas the joint overall contribution to growth might make it more appropriate to 
employ more human capital outside the financial sector during other stages. In this paper we 
are going to address some of these questions formally as well as empirically. 
2 Theoretical  analysis 
Our framework for the theoretical part is the theory of endogenous growth where we stress 
the role of human capital inside and outside the financial sector. Human capital enters the 
aggregate production function of a developed economy in two ways: Firstly, as an input factor 
for production. Secondly, professionals employed in the financial system add to efficient capi-
tal allocation by gathering and processing information and channeling society's savings into 
the most promising investment projects. Hence, when human capital is highly specialized, it 
may support both the production of output and add to sophistication in the financial sector.10 
Accordingly, we model financial engineering as specialized work which can improve the level 
of technological efficiency. 
                                                           
6  Seminal papers on 'poverty traps' and 'big pushes' with respect to financial development are MURPHY ET AL. 
(1989), GREENWOOD/JOVANOVIC (1990) and GREENWOOD/SMITH (1997). HARRISON ET AL. (1999) analyze 
the financial activity-real development interaction. An inflation threshold is highlighted by ROUS-
SEAU/WACHTEL (2002). 
7  See e.g. CLAGUE ET AL. (1997), LA PORTA ET AL. (1998), LEVINE (1999). 
8 See  e.g.  LEVINE (1999), TADESSE (2002). 
9  For a heuristic formalization of this argument, see PAGANO (1993). 
10 See  ROMER (1993: 544) for an earlier model with the financial sector as an immaterial factor of production.   – 5 –
2.1  What constitutes the finance growth-nexus 
The possibility of a causal relationship between financial activity (F) and economic growth 
has for a long time attracted the attention of researchers and policy makers. Generally, eco-
nomic theory postulates three distinguishable, but not mutually exclusive, and partly unin-
tended, effects of financial activity and development on overall economic performance: 
–  Firstly, the provision of an inexpensive and reliable means of payment (coins, later bank-
ing money), which historically came as a by-product of fractional reserve banking,11 
– secondly,  a  volume effect, where financial activity increases savings and thereby re-
sources that can be channeled into investment, and  
– thirdly,  an  allocation effect, according to which F improves the allocation of resources 
devoted to investment.12 
In earlier periods, the first effect of financial development – monetization – was obviously of 
major importance (EINZIG, 1949). Today, however, its importance is certainly marginal. On 
the other hand, the volume effect is theoretically ambiguous, since sounder financial institu-
tions may guarantee higher interest rates and reduce the incentives for precautionary savings; 
besides, the empirically evidence is at best very weak (FRY, 1995). Hence, if financial activity 
is supposed to nowadays play a decisive role in growth and development, the major line of 
causation should be through improvement of capital accumulation. 
Now, from a macro perspective, this allocation service is by no means costless. Quite to the 
contrary, it absorbs resources, most of all highly specialized and motivated human capital, 
which might be more helpful to foster economic growth and development when employed 
otherwise. Hence, while financial activity certainly has a growth enhancing potential, finan-
cial 'overdevelopment' might be even more harmful than financial 'underdevelopment'. Our 
paper will take a closer look at this conjecture. 
2.2  An endogenous growth model with financial activity-human capital interaction 
In this section, a growth model is formulated where financial development is based on human 
capital in two different ways: firstly, one part of human capital in the financial sector serves 
as a direct input factor in the production technology; secondly, another part of human capital 
which is employed in financial business to process information for innovative use adds to 
technological efficiency of the economy. Our starting point is the human capital story in (LU-
CAS, 1988) and its extensions by FUNKE/STRULIK (2000). However, while FUNKE/STRULIK are 
modeling human capital as homogeneous, we let it simultaneously enter in 
                                                           
11  For a detailed exposition of this, see KINDLEBERGER (1993). 
12  For the second and third effect, the seminal contribution is GURLEY/SHAW (1960).   – 6 –
–  final-good production, 
–  real-production technology development, 
–  financial-intermediation process knowledge. 
The benevolent social planer is faced with an economy characterized by a Cobb-Douglas 
technology producing a single homogenous final good Y  
 
R F
RF YA D KH H
γγ ηβ = , (1) 
where 0, , , , 0 RF A β ηγ γ >>  and  1 RF β ηγ γ + ++= . D is an index for financial intermedia-
tion skills, K is physical capital, and H is human capital, which splits into four parts 
  RFnH HH H H H =+++. (2) 
R H  and  F H  are input factors specialized into real and financial engineering in final produc-
tion,  n H  is accumulated knowledge on financial intermediation which boosts the level D of 
intermediation by 












 ∫   for  () , x ix ≡  (4) 
where δ ≥ 0 is an efficiency parameter of financial intermediation knowledge, and α  controls 
the rate of substitution  ) 1 /( 1 α ε − =  between different financial intermediation services i. The 
quantities x(i) are assumed to be the same (due to identical technology and symmetric de-
mand); and  H H  is spent on the development of skilled labor, i.e. 
  H HH ξ = & , (5) 
where 0 ξ >  is an efficiency parameter of the society's ability to enforce the development of 
working skills. An economy is characterized by sophisticated financial intermediation if H 
breaks up according to equation (2). 
The social planner's problem is to maximize society's inter-temporal utility function 





ρτ θ θ τ
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−− −  =− −  ∫ , (6) 
where  0 ρ >  denotes the time preference rate, 01 / 1 θ < <  is the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution and C is consumption. Thereby, utility optimization is subject to the resource 
constraint 
  KYCn x =−− &  (7)   – 7 –
and carried out by using  ,, , RF CxH H  and  n H  as control variables. The state variables are K, 
n and H. The costate variables of H are be denoted by  µ λ,  and ν . A first inspection of the 
current value Hamiltonian 
  [ ] [ ]
1/ () [( ) ]
RF
RF n H JU C A nx K H H Cn x H H
γγ αη β λµ δ ν ξ =+ − − + +  (8) 
shows that this model can be reduced to one where only the total amount  : YR F HH H =+of 
human capital matters to capture this input factor, because the proportions  / RY HH  and 
/ FY HH  are always held at their relative production-elasticity levels  () / RRF γ γγ +  and 
() / FR F γ γγ + . Indeed, the first order conditions for J with respect to  R H  and  F H  immedi-
ately imply  / / RFR F HH γ γ = . 
Proposition 1. Maximizing utility (6) under the constraints (3), (5) and (7) does not 
change when replacing the technology (1) by 
 
1
1 Y YA D K H
η ββ η − − = , (1') 
where 
  A A A
F R F R
F R F R < + =
+ ) (
1 ) /( :
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ  (9) 
and  YR F HHH =+. Thereby, we identify 
  ( ) :/ RY R R F HH γ γγ =+  
and 
  ( ) :/ FY F R F HH γ γγ =+ . (10) 
Hence, re-scaling factor of technological efficiency from  A to  1 A  appropriately, where 
1 AA < , our model of an economy with sophisticated financial intermediation reduces to an 
innovative economy with exactly one human capital input factor  Y H  of magnitude  RF HH + . 
This change has a level effect on output but does not affect the steady-state characteristics. 
This means that an economy with sophisticated financial intermediation (‘stage III’) has the 
following simple characteristics for the steady-state growth rates  YK gg
∗ ∗ =  and  H n gg
∗∗ = :13 




































− = . From equations (11) and (12), we have 
                                                           




∗∗ > . (13) 
Let us now look at different stages of financial intermediation. First, consider the case where 
no innovation takes place, i.e.  0 n = & , so that equation (1') can be rewritten in a condensed 
version by accounting for the trade-off between Y and η, where the number n of innovative 
activities is held constant: 
  x nY η = . (14) 
This follows from the first order condition with respect to x . Inserting equation (14) into 
1/ Dnx
α =  and rearranging for Y yields 
  ()
1 1 1 1
11 1
1 Y Yn K H A
η
ββ η α η
ηη η α η





Hence, total factor productivity  /(1 ) (1 )/(1 ) β ηβ η η − −−− −  again sums up to one for any 
given number n of innovative activities. 
Characterizing an economy of advanced financial intermediation ('stage II'), we assume that 
there are no further innovations, i.e.  0 n = & , and that there are no innovation skills, i.e.  0 n H = , 
but working skills may specialize into factor substitutes  R H  and  F H . The steady-state growth 
rates of Y, K and H are then identical and given by 
  ()
1 II II II
YKH ggg ξρ
θ





∗ = . (16) 
Comparing equations (15) and (11), we find that an economy with sophisticated financial in-
termediation grows at a higher steady-state rate than an economy with advanced financial 
intermediation because 





















Note that at the very early stage of development, a country's human capital might be so scarce 
that a continuous accumulation of knowledge in financial services cannot be sustained. For-
mally, in an economy with rudimentary financial intermediation ('stage I') there will be only 
one type of knowledge,  R H , and this will be used as a flexible input in production.  F H  is 
either kept at some constant level  F H  causing an imbalance effect, or, more restrictively, out-
put elasticity of  F H  does not differ significantly from zero ( 0 F γ = ). To ease comparison 
between stage-I and stage-II growth rates, we assume that for the stage-I and stage-II tech-
nologies the scaling factors A of technological efficiency and capital productivity β  are the 
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Comparing equations (18) and (15), we see that an economy with advanced financial interme-
diation grows at a steady-state rate which is at least as high as the one of an economy with 
















=≥ . (20) 
From equation (18), it follows that at stage I, real growth decreases with increasing human 
capital productivity  F γ . 
Passing from stage I to stage II, an economy experiences higher steady-state growth if  0 F γ > . 
In this case, the short-run dynamics are characterized by an upward jump in growth rates, af-
ter specialized human capital is allowed to adjust, and a subsequent decrease of growth, there-
after, towards the new steady-state rate 
II
Y g
∗ which exceeds 
I
Y g
∗. But an economy with rudi-
mentary intermediation and  0 F γ =  will not only be unable to improve growth when adopting 
advanced financial intermediation, because of 
II I
YY gg
∗ ∗ = . This economy will experience a 
negative scaling effect according to factor specialization, due to  1 AA <  (eq. (1'') and (1''')). 
This results in a lower level of output Y, given the same human capital and physical capital 
endowments. Economically speaking, to avoid this detrimental level effect of factor speciali-
zation, a social planner should devote a part of the disposable human skills  Y H  to an 'instan-
taneous' increase of the intermediation level 
1
Dn x




η η − , to offset the negative impact of factor specialization on real output when passing 
to advanced financial intermediation. 
Thus, in this model, an economy passing from rudimentary to sophisticated financial interme-
diation can suffer a negative level effect when entering advanced intermediation. However, 
advancing to sophisticated intermediation will definitively increase the steady-state growth 
rates and this overcompensates the earlier detrimental effect of financial development. 
2.3  Institutions, adjustment and growth 
Let us now analyze the effect from changes of institutional or socio-economic characteristics 
on short-run aspects, like output level and the speed of adjustment to the steady state, and on 
long-run growth levels. The following observations are direct consequences of section 2.2.14 
Proposition 2: Consider an economy passing ceteris paribus from rudimentary to ad-
vanced and further to sophisticated financial intermediation. Let  1 T  denote the time 
when the economy leaves stage-I intermediation. 




∗∗ ∗ >> . 
(ii) Breaks, 'poverty trap': There may be a short-term negative impact on output upon 
entering the stage of advanced intermediation if working skills enter production as dif-






T Y Y <  
(iii) Imbalance effect: There may be a balancing effect spurring initial growth to decline 
thereafter to steady-state growth, i.e. 








Y g t T g T g > ∆ + >  
Straightforward arguments show that the two short-term characteristics, poverty trap and im-
balance effect, also hold for an economy passing directly from rudimentary to sophisticated 
intermediation. The next three results hold for any stage of financial intermediation. 
Proposition 3: Good institutions always favor long-run growth rates, i.e.  / 0 Y dg dξ
∗ > . 
Proposition 4: A smaller fragmentation of the financial sector, i.e. a higher degree of 
intermediates substitution, always favors long-run growth, so that / 0 Y dg dα
∗ < . 
                                                           
14  For the imbalance effect see also BARRO/SALA-I-MARTIN (1995: 176–178)   – 11 –
While the above results characterize shifts in steady-state behavior, the following is on short-
term aspects and the adjustment behavior only, as the parameter δ  does not influence the 
steady-state. An increase in δ  enhances total factor productivity  ) (
η AD , i.e. it can be inter-
preted as an expression of society’s long-term commitment to innovations. 
Proposition 5: Long-term commitment accelerates the speed of adjustment to the 
steady state, formally  / 0 dY dδ
∗ > . Moreover, the output level is a positive function of 
the innovation rate δ  for any given level of endowments K and H. 
3 Empirical  analyses 
The recent interest in the ultimate sources of economic growth, the revival of the 'Schumpete-
rian' view of finance as a means of channeling society's savings into innovative activity and 
the availability of international data sets as well as the computational resources to handle 
them have led to a large number of empirical studies that include proxies for 'financial activ-
ity' (F) as explanatory variables in cross-country regressions of growth rates of per capita in-
come (or other proxies for economic development and growth) on its supposed determinants. 
These studies have repeatedly reported positive partial correlation between different indica-
tors of F and growth rates of per capita income or investment in subsequent years for large 
cross samples of heterogeneous countries.  
The objective of the following empirical cross-country analysis is to take a closer look at the 
nature of this partial correlation, which allows for an evaluation of some of the hypotheses 
derived above. To this end, a three-stage research design is adopted. 
The first step is a new multi-indicator measurement of financial activity (F). Specifically, we 
collect for a large sample of countries and various years different indicators for financial ac-
tivity that capture not only the degree of monetization or financial intermediation, but the 
share of resources a society devotes to run its financial system. The common variance of these 
indicators is identified and corresponding principal component score is computed for every 
observation. We regard the resulting encompassing indicator as more adequate for investiga-
tions into the sources of economic growth than the standard F proxies. 
The second step is to fit a standard cross-country growth equation. Specifically, based on a 
balanced panel data set on a large sample of countries with multiple observations through 
time, the growth rate of per capita income is regressed on its presumed determinants, which 
follow from an extended version of the aggregate production function. This set-up allows for 
the inclusion of country-specific and period-specific (country invariant) 'fixed effects' to re-
duce the inevitable omitted-variable bias. Our analysis so far mainly departs from the standard 
approach by introducing a new F variable.    – 12 –
In the third and final step, we relax the equality restriction for the structural parameters and 
screen for structural breaks or shifts in the finance-growth nexus. Specifically, standard tests 
for structural breaks are applied to the regression parameter of interest with respect to median 
splits of the sample by two socio-economic and political controls, 'institutional quality' and 
'type of financial system', which de facto amounts to a reduction of these controls on a di-
chotomous measurement level. Finally, to identify potential thresholds we order the sample 
by metric control variables which follow from the theoretical model as potential causes of – 
or signals for – structural shifts or breaks and run a number of threshold regressions. 
3.1  A new proxy for financial activity 
The construction of our new variable for financial activity aims at getting a reasonably reli-
able and comparable quantification of a resource based concept of financial activity. This no-
tion of financial development is thus different from the common notion of financial depth; it 
signifies a real rather than a monetary phenomenon.15 While this intention bears resemblance 
to the core argument of New Institutional Economics (NORTH 1990, WILLIAMSON 1985), 
namely that aggregate transaction costs are far from negligible and that financial institutions 
are a major response to this problem, we depart from the closely connected evolutionist ar-
gument that prevailing institutions – having survived the selection mechanism of the market – 
are the 'adequate' solution. Instead, we regard the amount of resources devoted to run these 
institutions as an indicator of the services rendered by the financial system to mitigate fric-
tions and market failure due to informational asymmetry. 
Specifically, our measurement approach rests on the assumption that the following set of indi-
cators which taken one by one are affected by a host of problems (first of all limited validity, 
but dubious reliability go along with this) can jointly be transformed to result in reasonably 
reliable, complete and valid measure for the intended notion of financial activity: 
–  The share of the labor force employed in the financial system, 
–  the share of the financial system in GDP, 
– the  traditional  F variable M2/GDP. 
                                                           
15  It is not claimed that the traditional notion of financial depth is not useful, but the degree of monetization 
and the aggregate credit volume channeled through the financial system – i.e. the 'traditional' variables – 
and the amount of resources needed to run a given financial system stand for different economic functions: 
While the former inform about the channels of finance, the latter measure the intensity of financial services. 
Furthermore, recall that the usual indicators of financial repression/liberalization and financial depth are 
likely to suffer from ambiguity (expressing monetary and credit volumes as well as overheating and likeli-
hood of financial crash). Moreover, while monetary indicators like M2/GDP are very hard to compare 
across time and space due to institutional diversity and change, indicators for the magnitude of financial ac-
tivity are likely to be less sensitive to minor changes in institutional regulations, domestic and international 
shocks and business cycles.   – 13 –
The common variance of the three indicators is identified by means of principal component 
analysis.16 Practically, to prepare the raw data, the indicator variables were screened for obvi-
ous errors and incompatibilities. Then, operational rules were be formulated how to treat 
missing values.17 Finally, all data – for 90 countries and nine points in time (1960, 1965, ..., 
2000) – were pooled into a panel of N = 810, and the first principal component was extracted. 
The results are unambiguous: the first component already accounts for 75% of total variance, 
and all communalities are .69 or higher, which clearly implies a one-dimensional data space. 
Accordingly, in what follows, we shall take the factor values of the first component as our 
numerical estimates for F. 
3.2  Derivation of reduced form for estimation 
The present empirical literature on economic growth commonly starts from an aggregate pro-
duction function with the traditional inputs plus additional knowledge-related variables. As a 
rule, some of the latter are modeled as public goods; partly in the case of human capital; en-
tirely with respect to technical knowledge or growth enhancing organizational features.18 The 
standard procedure is to refer to a theoretical core, the 'augmented' Cobb/Douglas aggregate 
production function that relates GDP in country i at time t to the factors of production 
 Y i,t = Ai,t Kαi,t Lßi,t Hγi,t ,  (21) 
where Y is GDP, total factor productivity (TFP), K physical capital, L labor and H human 
capital. Dividing through L, taking logs and time derivates and rearranging terms yields 
 g(Y/L)i,t = g(A)i,t + α g(K/L)i,t + γ g(H/L)i,t + (α+ß+γ–1) g(L)i,t, (22) 
where the notation g(X) stands for the continuous growth rate of X. First, note that assuming 
constant returns to scale  
 ( α + ß + γ – 1),    (23) 
L drops from the right hand side of (22).19 To incorporate the theoretical contributions of the 
1990s, the growth rate of the overall efficiency level (TFP) variable A itself is modeled as a 
function ƒ of a set of further variables. A general notation for a linear approach is 
                                                           
16  If the correlations between the desired representations are high, but measurement errors or stochastic 
shocks have little common variance, such a latent variable can serve as a better proxy for F than individual 
scores for a single indicator alone. To come close to this, a 'technical' condition is that the indicator vari-
ables have to be measured independently. This condition is satisfied here. 
17  The general strategy was to estimate missing values in time by interpolation, extrapolation, trend analysis, 
and – where possible – by regression on exogenous variables, but to exclude all observations, where the 
majority of data would result from estimation rather than from original data.  
18 See  HOOVER/PEREZ 2000 for an elaboration of this point. 
19  A pre-test using the data to be employed in what follows, failed to reject the null hypothesis (α + ß + γ = 1).   – 14 –
 g(A)i,t = a0 + a1 ln (Y/L)i,t–1 + a2 Xi,t–1   (24) 
where ln (Y/L)i,t–1 captures the 'catching-up' potential, and X is a variable matrix containing a 
number of other potentially important determinants of g(A), which, of course, remain open to 
questions, but can be further decomposed in the spirit of our theoretical model as follows.  
A comparison between equation (1) on the one hand with equations (22) and (24) on the other 
hand reveals that our theoretical starting point is a distinctive specification of the traditional 
empirical approach, where the TFP is disaggregated into a finance component D
η and a re-
maining A' and Lß Hγ, i.e. the labor related inputs are split into the different human capital 
components employed in the financial and the real sector. 
For the time being, however, aiming at a broad sample of countries, the data basis is not suffi-
cient to operationalize (1) in a straight-forward manner. We therefore have to let H stand for 
skilled labor HF and HR. However, a distinction of D
η and A' is feasible, if we take F as a 
proxy for g(D). Accordingly, the reduced form to be estimated is  
                  g(Y/L)i,t = ß0 + ß1 g(K/L)i,t + ß2 g(H/L)i,t + ß3 ln (Y/L)i,t–1 + ß4 Fi,t–1 . (25) 
where ß4 in equation (25) corresponds to η in equation (1). 
3.3 Data 
The sample consists of 90 countries. If not stated otherwise (for details, see appendix), the 
data are taken from the Penn World Table 6.1, which comprises annual observations from 
1950–2000. With regard to data availability, our panel starts in 1960. The observations for 
every fifth year (1960, 1965, ..., 2000) are stacked, resulting in a balanced panel of 90 × 9 = 
810 points, or 90 × 8 = 720 five-year growth intervals. Real GDP is in 'international $', with 
1996 as the common base. Labor refers to the number of people aged 15–64. Capital stock 
growth rates are computed on the basis of investment rates and a perpetual inventory calculus. 
Human capital accumulation is represented by the rate of change of educational attainment 
(mean years of schooling). 
3.4  Cross-country growth regression results 
We are now equipped with either straightforward data or at least with reasonably well defined 
proxies for all variables referred to in the reduced form (25). Drawing on our panel data set of 
90 countries and 8 growth periods of five years (N = 720), we estimate a fixed effects model 
with dummy variables for I–1 countries i and T–1 periods, where g(Y/L)i,t is regressed on its 
presumed determinants including lagged F: 
 g(Y/L)i,t = ß0 + ßi + ßt +  ß1 g(K/L)i,t + ß2 g(H/L)i,t + ß3 ln (Y/L)i,t–1 + ß4 Fi,t–1 + εi,t. (26)   – 15 –
The results are as follows: The fixed effects – country as well as period (not reproduced be-
low) – are jointly highly significant, so that – while no specific interpretation of the estimates 
is intended – they must indeed be included in order to reduce missing variable bias. The coef-
ficients ß1 to ß4 are given in equation (27): 
 g(Y/L)i,t = .319 g(K/L)i,t + .064 g(H/L)i,t – .026 ln (Y/L)i,t–1 + .009 Fi,t–1 + εi,t , (27) 
                 (11.0)                (1.76)              (–5.84)                      (2.57) 
This first result is obviously in line with the broad theoretical reasoning behind (26). All point 
estimates are significantly different from zero, given their expected signs, in one-tailed tests 
(t-statistics in brackets, p ≤ 5%). Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficients are compatible 
with a priori reasoning: ß1 of roughly 1/3 is well in line with the a empirical production elas-
ticity of physical capital (or capital's factor share) in the traditional Cobb-Douglas-framework, 
and, though little is known about the expected magnitude of human capital (in addition to 
'raw' labor, to which the estimation equation is normalized), to growth a positive elasticity of 
more than 6% (ß2) does not contradict standard calculations of the social rate of return to hu-
man capital. The catching-up variable ß3 enters negatively, as expected. Last but not least, the 
financial activity coefficient ß4 is significantly positive which is in line with the basic predic-
tion of our theoretical model. The overall fit of our model (R² = .50), however, shows that 
much remains to be explained.20 
3.5  Looking for structural shifts 
We now proceed to the third and final step of our empirical analysis. Recall that the theoreti-
cal model implies various structural breaks or shifts in the finance-growth nexus. Specifically, 
potential causes or signals for structural shifts or breaks are the prevalence/absence of good 
institutions, the way a society handles its financial interrelations (type of financial system), 
the level of financial development and – as follows from the model – characteristic deviations 
of financial activity from its appropriate intensity, given its state of development. 
To address these hypotheses empirically, we relax the restriction ß4 = .009 implied by the 
point estimate in (27) and let it take different values for two complementary subgroups that 
result from sample splits by dichotomous control variables. In this way, we firstly address 
proposition 3 which states that good institutions are a prerequisite for the growth enhancing 
properties of financial activity, and secondly proposition 5 according to which a financial 
system favoring long-term commitment might be superior to an 'arm's length' type financial 
system. To capture a broad concept of institutional quality we refer jointly to 
                                                           
20  Yet a coefficient of determination around 50% is not quite unusual in cross-country growth regressions, and 
we are dealing with a panel of four decades, where other analyses seldom cover more than twenty or thirty 
years. Moreover, this model is comparatively parsimonious with respect to the number of explicit regres-
sors, so one should expect a considerable share of residual variance.   – 16 –
–  the 'rule of law index' (by Political Risk Inc.), taken from EASTERLY/LEVINE (1997), 
–  the 'corruption index' with the same source as above, 
–  the 'institutional quality index' ICRGE80, taken from SACHS/WARNER (1997), 
–  the prevalence of market segmentation (black market premium BMP) here transformed as  
ln (1 + BMP), where BMP is taken from EASTERLY/LEVINE (1997) 
and identify their common variance, i.e. the first principal component, by which we order our 
90 countries and split them at the median into a 'poor institutional quality' (PIQ) and a 'high 
institutional quality' subgroup (HIQ), respectively. 
Secondly, a 'bank-based' financial system, where close long-term relationships are preferred 
to 'arms’ length finance' and shareholders' rights at times have to stand behind those of stake-
holders is contrasted to a 'market-based' financial system. These categories are frequently dis-
cussed in a narrative fashion, however, they are notoriously difficult to be identified empiri-
cally. Fortunately, researchers now can refer to first results of the efforts of Ross Levine and 
his collaborators who recently made accessible to the research community a set of dummy 
variable for 'market-based' and 'bank-based' financial systems (DEMIRGUÇ-KUNT/LEVINE, 
1999). On this basis, we define two additional dummy variables: 
–  MB = 1 if a financial system is classified as 'market-based', MB = 0 otherwise, 
–  BB = 1 if a financial system is classified as 'bank-based', BB = 0 otherwise.21 
Now, regression (27) is re-run with two different coefficients ß4' and ß4" for the subgroups.  
For the institutional quality split the results are unambiguous: as one would expect, ß4 is sig-
nificantly higher (p < .05) when the institutional framework is better. In addition, while it is 
significantly positive for the HIQ group (t = 2.90), the point estimate for the PIQ group is 
negative, though not significantly different from zero (t = –.12). In other words, while finan-
cial activity is indeed growth promoting in an environment with 'good institutions',22 it does 
not seem to matter for overall economic performance when institutions are of low quality. 
Moreover, this difference between the two PIQ and HIQ subgroups with respect to the finan-
cial activity regressor does not show up when we test for similar breaks with respect to physi-
cal and human capital accumulation: ß1 – referring to g(K/L) – shows a somewhat higher HIQ 
point estimate, but is far from being significantly different between the subgroups (p = .28) 
and ß2 – referring to g(H/L) – is not affected at all (p = .96). 
Turning to the 'bank-based' versus 'market-based' financial system distinction, the analysis 
does not reveal any conclusive results. Specifically, ß4 scores slightly higher (but not statisti-
cally significantly: t = .71) in the MB subgroup, but the same is true for the BB subgroup 
                                                           
21 Note  that  DEMIRGUÇ-KUNT/LEVINE’s 'market-based' versus 'bank-based' classification applies for 54 of our 
90 countries. Since the missing values can only be labeled as either 'non market-based' or 'non bank-based', 
this distinction is not complementary but rather amounts to two different sample splits. 
22  At least, to put it more modestly, our results do not contradict this conjecture.   – 17 –
(t = .27). Since, as noted above, the subgroups are not complementary, this is probably due to 
the fact that 36 countries in our sample which DEMIRGUÇ-KUNT/LEVINE classify neither as 
MB nor as BB had to be coded as zero, and it is not implausible to assume that these countries 
– apart from missing data – share common characteristics that drive the estimates down in 
either case. If anything, this finding can be interpreted to support the view that financial frag-
mentation hampers long-run growth (proposition 4), but – like others before us (see LEVINE, 
2002) – we were not able to find evidence in favor of any specific type of financial system. 
Finally, we turn to the dimension that our model identified as central with respect to the pos-
sibilities of structural shifts or breaks within the finance-growth nexus: financial development 
proper. First, note that – unlike the previous control – this variable is measured on a continu-
ous scale and therefore permits to order the entire pooled data set.23 Furthermore, since pool-
ing data implies to regard them as independent observations, a split by a continuous variable 
allows for N–1 = 719 alternative critical values. Accordingly, we can refer to a considerably 
more flexible method than in the previous step and conduct threshold regressions (HANSEN, 
1999) for the coefficient of lagged F. Specifically, we order the 720 observations of the panel 
by the control variable. Then, we perform 719 repeated sample split regression with ß4 set 
free across subgroups, where the total is divided into a group that scores low with respect to 
the control variable and a corresponding high scoring group. Practically, we obtain the sample 
splits by defining a vector of dummy variables D(C)n that equals zero if an observation be-
longs to the high-scoring subgroup with respect to the control variable C, and one if other-
wise, and n denotes the rank position of the split (n = 1, 2, ..., 719). Then, D × Fi,t–1 is in-
cluded as an additional regressor in (23) to get 
                       g(Y/L)i,t = ß0 + ßi + ßt +  ß1 g(K/L)i,t + ß2 g(H/L)i,t + ß3 ln (Y/L)i,t–1   (28) 
                                     + ß4 Fi,t–1 + ß5 D × Fi,t–1 + εi,t ,  
which we run 719 times for every C. Now, as in a standard regression set-up, ß5 is the point 
estimate of the difference of ß4 for the two groups D = 0 and D = 1 and the t-statistics informs 
about its significance. Specifically, in equation (28), the t-statistics of ß5 shows if and in how 
far the growth promoting effect of lagged F in the low-scoring sub-sample deviates from the 
total sample.  
We present the results as charts of the t-statistics of ß5 for all 719 sample splits. To facilitate 
the interpretation, we add a zero line and mark the ±1.961 limits of 5%-significance which 
would apply for a two-tailed test. Note that in the absence of systematic shifts or breaks in the 
finance-growth nexus with respect to a given control variable, the t-statistic plots should show 
white noise only. 
                                                           
23  Recall that the preceding tests for structural breaks refer to different groups of countries (n = 90) rather than 
to different groups of observations (n = 720)   – 18 –
Graph 1 plots the t-statistics of lagged F with respect to F itself as control variable. Now, re-
call that a significantly negative ß5 implies that the group of observations on the left, i.e. the 
low-scorers with respect to the control variable, are ceteris paribus characterized by a less 
pronounced finance-growth nexus – as reflected by the point estimate for the Fi,t–1 coefficient 
– than the rest of the sample, and the opposite holds for positive t-statistics of ß5. Moreover, 
isolated spikes of the t-plots would rather be attributed to outliers with high leverage than to 
systematic shifts and breaks between groups of observations. On the other hand, by the same 
reasoning, t-statistics that stay above or below the zero-line for and extended number of splits 
would be more indicative of a systematic deviation from white noise, even if the conventional 
critical values of p are not met. Accordingly, the low initial domain in Graph 1 is indicating 
signs of a low-F poverty trap.  
Graph 1: Control variable: Fi,t–1 about here 
If anything, we would hence conclude that this adds some, albeit weak, evidence to the 'big 
push' story of proposition 2 (ii), where the building-up phase of F from very low levels in-
duces losses due to high opportunity costs and low returns. However, taking the level of F as 
control variable does not wholly capture the spirit of our model, which postulates that finan-
cial over- or underdevelopment (rather than the level) might make financial activity less bene-
ficial than it would be on a balanced development path. Specifically, the propositions from the 
theoretical model imply the concept of a 'balanced growth path' for F, where the optimum 
level of F is contingent on the realization of a set of variables, particularly development in 
general and the stock highly qualified human capital.  
Let us assume that for a first and tentative analysis, the main dimensions of this contingency 
can empirically by captured by two variables, overall development and highly qualified hu-
man (proxied by the share of the working age population with tertiary education TER from the 
latest BARRO/LEE web-database). Then, a regression of F on (Y/L) and TER will result in pre-
dicted values of 'balanced' financial activity F* and in residuals, which we can interpret as the 
degree of deviation of the empirical level of F from balanced F*.24 In other words, negative 
(positive) residuals tell us how much an observation is under- or over-scoring with respect to 
what we would expect given its levels of (Y/L) and TER. The corresponding t-statistics 
threshold plot for the deviation of Fi,t–1 from Fi,t–1*, is shown in graph 2.  
Graph 2: Control variable: deviation of Fi,t–1 from Fi,t–1* about here 
Here, apart from a noisy domain at the far left, domain covering roughly the first 100 under-
scorers, the graph shows a remarkably regular pattern: a continuous rise of the t-statistics for 
ß5 up to about observation No. 500 (well exceeding what would be conventional levels of 
significance in a test for a structural break), and a pronounced drop thereafter. This finding 
                                                           
24 The  regression  Fi,t–1 = ß0 + ß1 (Y/L) i,t–1 + ß2 TERi,t–1 results in significantly positive coefficients for 
both regressors, and a fairly high R² of 72% (N = 720).   – 19 –
implies that the 200 or so most pronounced over-scorers25 in Fi,t–1 from Fi,t–1* have indeed 
driven their financial activity too far and reap significantly less macroeconomic benefits from 
a given input of financial activity then countries that keep on more balanced development 
path.26 
4  Summary and conclusions 
To highlight the causal links between financial activity and economic growth, a theoretical 
endogenous growth model is discussed, and an empirical cross-country growth analyses are 
conducted.  
In the modeling part, we find that plausible assumptions can generate various breaks, poverty 
traps, imbalance effects and structural shifts in the finance-growth nexus, suggesting that the 
linear approach, which dominates empirical studies on the effect of financial activity and 
growth, may not be appropriate.  
We then develop an empirical framework to address this point. To this end, we first fit our 
data (referring to a panel of 90 countries from 1960–2000) to a standard growth equation 
which – apart from our focal variable: a proxy for financial activity – includes the usual 
growth regressors as well as fixed country and period effects. Then, we order the sample by 
control variables which follow from our model as potential causes or signals for structural 
shifts or breaks. Finally, a number of threshold regressions indeed reveal signs for structural 
shifts or breaks that are consistent with the model. Most importantly, countries seem to gain 
less from a given level of financial activity, if it exceeds what would follow from a well bal-
anced expansion path given its overall state of development. 
We concede that, given the level of abstraction in both the theoretical model and the data 
based analyses, these results cannot qualify as a strong validation of any particular model. 
However, we are presenting coherent theoretical as well as empirical evidence for the suspi-
cion that the finance-growth nexus is characterized by various non-linearities, which might 
cast some doubt on some of the more generalizing conclusions in the recent literature on fi-
nance and growth. 
                                                           
25  The deviation of predicted ('balanced') and empirical F is closest to Zero for observations 406 and 407. 
Note that the peak of the t-statistics plot (observation No. 493) lies to the right hand of the point, i.e. in the 
domain of the over-scorers. 
26  The same analyses were conducted with initial per capita income (Y/L)i,t–1 and initial human capital 
(H/L)i,t–1. The resulting t-statistics plots, however, did not show any pattern that could be interpreted as 
substantially different from a white noise.   – 20 –
5  Appendix: country sample, data and sources 
The sample consists of all countries for which the necessary data could be collected, with the 
exception of countries that are very small (population less than one million), of countries with 
centrally planned economies through most of the period 1970–90, of countries in which oil 
exports accounted for more than 20% of GDP in 1985, and of countries with war or civil war 
claiming a death toll exceeding 2.5% of the population during 1970–88. The exclusion of 
these countries is to acknowledge that it makes little sense to run regressions with countries 
which are fundamentally different from usual conditions (HARBERGER 1998). 
If not mentioned otherwise, data are from the Penn World Table 6.1, October 2002. 
Physical capital (K) is estimated by the perpetual inventory method as specified for LDC's by 
HARBERGER (1978) and refined by NEHRU/DHARESHWAR (1993), using a common deprecia-
tion rate of 10%.  
Financial development (F) is computed as the first principal component of three standardized 
indicators for financial activity: (1) the share of the financial sector in GDP (from the UN NA-
TIONAL ACCOUNT STATISTICS, referring to 'finance, insurance and business services', the se-
ries have been extended by corresponding data from the Word Development Indicators online 
access data base), (2) the share of labor employed in the financial system (from the ILO 
YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS, the corresponding ISIC-2 classification is 'major division 
8': financial institutions, insurance, real estate and business services), (3) M2/GDP (source: 
Word Development Indicators, online access 2003). 
Human capital (H/L) is taken from the latest version of the BARRO/LEE web-data base refer-
ring to mean years of schooling in the population aged 15–65. 
Highly qualified human capital (TER) is proxied by the share of the working age (15–65) 
population with tertiary education as tabled in the BARRO/LEE web-database. 
Rule of law index (Political Risk Services), source: EASTERLY/LEVINE (1997). 
Corruption index (Political Risk Services), source: EASTERLY/LEVINE (1997). 
Institutional quality index (Political Risk Services) source: SACHS/WARNER (1997). 
Black market premium, source: EASTERLY/LEVINE (1997). 
Market-based/bank-based financial system classification, source: DEMIRGUÇ-KUNT/LEVINE 
(1999).   – 21 –
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Graph 1: t-statistics for ß5,  
control variable: Fi,t–1 
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Graph 2: t-statistics for ß5,  
control variable: deviation of Fi,t–1 from Fi,t–1*, given (Y/L)i,t–1 and TERi,t–1 
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